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This paper offers a vantage point through which to assess the phenomenon of projects codifying 
private law that are undertaken by private persons or institutions, distinct from legislatures and 
state-sponsored codification and law-revision projects. The private institution on which this 
paper focuses is the American Law Institute (ALI). ALI works in statutory form—most notably 
the Uniform Commercial Code and the Model Penal Code—as well as through projects that 
generate “Principles” to guide legal development within their specific fields and “Restatements” 
that authoritatively cover the law in a field. 
 
The history of the Restatements sketched in this essay fits within the prototype of Searching for 
Utopia with which the paper begins. Although the Restatements do not control their subsequent 
reception by courts, at times Restatements succeed in anticipating legal development. This paper 
also demonstrates that ambiguity accompanies the underlying terminology of authority and, for 
that matter, private law. Finally, and for many reasons, contemporary Restatements speak to an 
audience of disbelief in the existence of one common law that exists autonomously of invading 
influences, including statutes.  How to assess authority, influence, and success for a Restatement 
are more interesting questions 
 
     Introduction 
 
 This paper offers a vantage point through which to assess the phenomenon of projects  
codifying private law that are undertaken by private persons or institutions, distinct from 
legislatures and state-sponsored codification and law-revision projects. My institutional focus is 
the American Law Institute (ALI), which since its founding in 1923 has promulgated 
Restatements in many areas of the law, plus work in statutory form—most notably the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Model Penal Code—and projects that generate “Principles” to guide 
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legal development within their specific fields. A private tax-exempt organization,1 the ALI 
chooses its own members and has developed elaborate procedures and internal practices, some of 
which are discussed below. Although the ALI’s early history is significant to understanding its 
ongoing work,2 my temporal focus is contemporary and is shaped by my experience as the 
Reporter for the ALI’s Restatement (Third) of Agency, adopted and promulgated by the ALI in 
2005.3 Agency (Third) succeeds Agency (Second), which in 1958 succeeded the original 
Restatement of Agency, completed in 1933. Although the successive Restatements of Agency 
are my primary concern, I refer to the history of other Restatements, in particular those covering 
Torts. 
 It is incontestable that the ALI’s work—and in particular the project of restating private-
law subjects like agency—is not static. That is, change external to the ALI itself and the texts it 
promulgates tends to prompt other changes, including shifts in the functions that a Restatement 
serves, the structure of Restatements as texts, and the succession of one Restatement by another, 
as well as the nature of the work that the ALI undertakes. For reasons I discuss later, more of the 
ALI’s work following the first generation of Restatements consisted of statutory projects. To be 
sure, the ALI’s relatively long life among contemporary sponsors of non-state codifications 
highlights the phenomenon of change with more immediacy than is so for younger institutions 
                                                 
1Although the ALI is not an instrumentality of the United States or of any state, its 
federal tax-exempt status means its property and net income are not subject to taxation, and its 
public-regarding purposes make it eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions from donors.  
  
2On the early history, see the numerous sources cited in, e.g., Adams, Kristin David. 2004.  
The Folly of Uniformity:  Lessons from the Restatement Movement.  Hofstra Law Review 33:423, 
432n.41.  (hereinafter cited as Adams, Lessons).  
 
3Publication in final form followed in 2006. The ALI publishes Restatements pursuant to 
a long-lived joint venture with the West Publishing Company. The ALI (not the individual 
Restatement Reporter) owns the copyright interest in the work. 
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and the texts they sponsor. Nonetheless, responses to change warrant thought in connection with 
other non-state projects that promulgate texts intended to be authoritative or influential. The 
goals and purposes for which the ALI was founded imply that its work may be dynamic over 
time. Its ALI’s Certificate of Incorporation states that 
The particular business and objects of the society are educational, and are to 
promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to 
social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and 
carry on scholarly and scientific work.4 
 
These organizational purposes, as applied to an ongoing organization that endures over time, 
may require new texts that supplant old ones.5  
 The ALI’s history also invites reflection on the nature of its influence and the status of its 
authority in the development of law in the United States, plus shifts in these over time. I suspect 
that one’s prototype of the law and of legal change shapes how these questions might be framed 
and answered. Some prototypes may be a better descriptive fit for some jurisdictions than others. 
Two opposing prototypes come to mind. First, an author or sponsor of a legal text intended to be 
authoritative could be characterized as an architect making design choices that are articulated 
through rules that, stated ex ante, are determinative of subsequent outcomes to which the rules 
apply. The end result, like a structurally-sound building constructed on the basis of an architect’s 
plans, is static. Change within this prototype requires either outflanking the rule system or 
amending it. Although an author or sponsor of legal change within this prototype might be a state 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4American Law Institute. 1923.  Certificate of Incorporation. www.ali.org/doc/charter.pdf. 
Accessed 27 Feb 2013. 
 
5For recognition that “it was natural for the restatements to get out of date,” see Jansen, 
Nils and Ralf Michaels. 2007.  Private Law and the State:  Comparative Perceptions and Historical 
Observations 15, 57.  2008.  Beyond the State:  Rethinking Private Law.  (Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels 
eds. 2008)  
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instrumentality—such as a civil code commission or other official drafting body—non-state 
actors may sponsor legal change through wide-sweeping work with an architectural or ex-ante 
quality, comparable to the ALI’s initial and ongoing projects concerning the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  
 In contrast, consider the relationships implied by Jan Fabre’s sculpture, Searching for 
Utopia, a cast I saw on display in south Amsterdam at the intersection of Apollolaan and 
Beethovenstraat.6 Searching for Utopia is a monumental work in bronze that depicts a large and 
finely-detailed tortoise, mounted by a small human figure (the sculptor himself) who holds reins 
through which the tortoise might be directed. The label accompanying the sculpture proposed 
that it be understood as a visualization of the wisdom of making incremental and slow progress 
towards Thomas More’s Utopia or its non-fictional counterparts. However, the sculpture invites 
multiple understandings. For our immediate purposes, the relationship between the rider and the 
giant tortoise may capture some of the relationship between the ALI as promulgator of 
Restatements and the onward development of law in the United States on subjects that the 
Restatements cover. Like Jan Fabre’s giant tortoise, the law may be guided in its development 
when judges apply rules as clarified or simplified by a Restatement. And like the human rider 
atop the tortoise, the two remain separate actors because the ALI is an autonomous institution 
separate from courts and the state more generally. 
 Alternatively, courts may ignore a Restatement’s suggestive reins, as a giant tortoise may 
proceed on a course otherwise determined by it. The influence or authority of a non-state legal 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
6For an image of Searching for Utopia, see Fabre, Jan.  2011.  Searching for Utopia.  




text within this prototype may occur incrementally, necessarily awaiting the long view for 
overall assessment and for incorporating the prospect of significant variation, both from the text 
and among courts. Depending on their subject, the force of a Restatement’s reins will vary and, 
within subjects, vary from issue to issue. This variation may be a function of issues and subjects: 
some are more controversial than others and individual Restatements vary in other ways, 
including their continuing vitality over time. Moreover, Restatements for some subjects—torts in 
particular—necessarily reflect the inseparable impact of institutions of civil procedure on 
substantive legal rules. This is because the significance of the lay jury in shapes tort doctrine in 
the United States, as reflected in the Restatements. Although this effect might be characterized as 
a distortion of tort doctrine,7 more neutrally it constitutes just another circumstance shaping tort 
law,8 comparable perhaps to a tortoise’s instinct to amble toward water or food. In any event, 
and as discussed below, qualities inescapably present in the ALI’s work—its mutability over 
time and its variability in influence—help explain the emphasis with which the organization has 
defined itself as the author of work it promulgates.        
 
      Authors and Procedures 
 It is no mere matter of legal form or commercial expediency that the ALI itself holds the 
copyright interest in Restatements. Reporters, who are responsible for drafting and researching, 
                                                 
7See Green, Michael. 2011.  The Impact of the Civil Jury on American Tort Law.  Pepperdine 
Law Review. 38: 337. 
 
8One documented example of another circumstance is the influence of lobbying by pro-
defendant organizations to champion the enactment of statutes that cap recoveries or, one way or 
another, reduce the prospect of recovery. See Cross, Frank.  2011.  Tort Law and the American 
Economy.  Minnesota Law Review 96:28.  Professor Cross’s data show no negative effects 
associated with more pro-plaintiff tort law; indeed pro-plaintiff tort law appears to be associated 
with economic growth. Id. at 86-89.  
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are not the ALI’s employees (and thus Restatements are not so obviously characterized as works 
made for hire) but, according to the Institute’s Handbook, a Reporter “reports to the Institute by 
means of a series of drafts, which are then reviewed according to the deliberative processes 
established by the Institute and revised as a result of these processes.”9 Most Reporters are full-
time professors of law; all are appointed by the ALI’s Council on the recommendation of its 
Director. Under the ALI’s bylaws, publication of any work as that of the ALI requires “approval  
by both the membership and the Council,”10 which is the Institute’s governing body. An impasse 
between a Reporter and the Council may lead to the Reporter’s resignation. This occurred most 
recently to my knowledge in the Restatement project on economic torts. As the Reporter’s 2007 
letter of resignation characterized the dispute,  
At the meeting I presented Council Draft No. 2 covering much of the field of 
economic negligence. There was strong disagreement voiced at the meeting with 
the direction taken in the draft. The draft states the law of economic negligence 
(and in particular negligent misstatement) in terms that emphasize its relation to 
contract law and that distinguish the law of economic negligence from accident 
law involving physical harm. The criticism was that the law of economic 
negligence should be situated within a general tort of negligence....11 
 
In 2010, the project resumed with a new Reporter. Although the 2012 Tentative Draft submitted 
by the ALI’s Council to the ALI Annual Meeting explained that courts “impose tort liability for 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
9American Law Institute.  2005.  Capturing the Voice of the American Law Institute:  A 
Handbook for ALI Reporters and Those Who Review Their Work 1.  www.ali.org/doc/stylemanual.pdf.  
Accessed 27 Feb 2013.   (hereinafter cited as ALI, Handbook).  
 
10American Law Institute.  Bylaw 6.  www.ali.org/doc/Bylaws07/pdf.  Accessed 27 Feb 2013. 
 
11Feldthusen, Bruce.  2011.  What the United States Taught the Commonwealth About Pure 
Economic Loss:  Time to Repay the Favor.  Pepperdine Law Review.  38:309,319-320.  (quoting Letter 
from Mark P. Gergen, Fondren Chair of Faculty Excellence, University of Texas School of Law, 
to Advisers, Consultants, and Council Members, American Law Institute (Dec. 2007)). 
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economic loss more selectively than liability for other types of harm,”12 liability for negligent 
misrepresentations “depends on the same standard of care familiar from other cases of 
negligence,” with the defendant’s duty limited in a number of respects.13  
 As this example illustrates, the ALI’s organizational structure is complex and is geared to 
enhance the institutional character of authorship of the ALI’s end-products. Many components of 
this structure and its processes tend to distance the Restatements themselves from the individual 
Reporters associated with them, enveloping the final product in a carapace of institutional 
authorship. To be sure, individual Reporters remain the first movers for each text, and retain 
what may be considerable powers of persuasion to champion their work, but collapsing 
authorship of a Restatement into an individual Reporter’s persona misunderstands both the ALI 
and Restatements.  
 The ALI’s deliberative processes include, for each Restatement project, a group of 
Advisers appointed by the Institute’s Council and a separate group (the Members Consultative 
Group) composed of members who choose to receive working drafts from the project and who 
have the opportunity to meet as a group with the Reporter. Unlike the ALI’s Council and its 
membership, the Advisers and Members Consultative Group associated with a Restatement do 
not hold veto powers. Depending on the subject, interim drafts of Restatement projects may 
attract wider audiences among practicing lawyers, academics, and organized interest groups. As 
in its earliest days, the ALI’s work continues to proceed, project-by-project, through in-person 
meetings at which successive drafts produced by the Reporter are reviewed. Thus, delineated 
                                                 
 
12Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Economic Harm §1,cmt.c. 2012.  (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, Apr. 4, 2012). 
13Id. § 5, cmt. b. 
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procedures, iterative consultations and revisions, and sequential approvals all shape the outcome 
of any Restatement’s text.14     
 From its early days, the ALI’s leadership worked to assure some measure of consistency 
across Restatement projects. During the sequence of meetings that led to the first Restatement of 
Agency, the ALI’s first Director, William Draper Lewis, often instructed the Reporter for 
Agency to consult with the Reporter for another subject to co-ordinate their terminology or 
treatment of overlapping questions, occasionally directing the Agency Reporter to obtain an 
answer to a specific question from another project’s Reporter.15 Reporters for other projects 
occasionally attended meetings of the Advisers for Agency and were credited with solving 
problems in drafting the Restatement’s text.16 The ALI’s practices in its early days are consistent 
with an organization that took its work and itself seriously. A stenographer made a transcript of 
the exchanges at Advisers’ meetings, followed by transmission of a transcription via carbon 
paper on onion-skin copies to the Reporter and each Adviser.17  
                                                 
14Schwartz, Alan and Robert E. Scott.  1995.  The Political Economy of Private Legislatures.  
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 143:595,650.   Their primary focus in this article, revisions 
to the UCC, may limit the force of the article’s conclusions as applied to Restatements. The 
general conclusions are that a “private legislature” (like the ALI) “will have a strong status quo 
bias and sometimes will be captured by private interests.” Id. But apart from a brief treatment of 
an early round of work on the Restatement Third of Torts applicable to one issue in products 
liability, see id. at 648-649, the article does not address Restatement projects. 
   
15DeMott, Deborah A.  2007.  The First Restatement of Agency:  What Was the Agenda?.  
Southern Illinois Law Journal 32: 17,24. 
 
16Id. at 24-25. 
17This practice has been discontinued. The records it created are, unsurprisingly, full of 
insight into the intellectual and institutional development of the ALI’s work in its early era. The 
ALI continues to publish transcripts of its Annual Meetings, but the earlier practice of publishing 
minutes from Council meetings has also been discontinued. The Institute’s Archives (which are 
not complete) are maintained by and accessible through the University of Pennsylvania.  The Biddle 
Law Library.  www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ali/.  Accessed 27 Feb 2013. 
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 More recently, the ALI formalized its general expectations of Reporters in a 2005 
Handbook, which was “conceived as a means of both articulating and preserving an 
appropriately uniform style for the various products of the Institute ....”18 The Handbook 
recognizes that “the prospects for achieving and maintaining a comprehensive “Restatement of 
the Law appear increasingly remote” because “today’s Restatements tend to be separate 
articulations of increasingly discrete areas of the law,” and the ALI has many projects that do not 
aim to produce Restatements.19 Nonetheless, a characteristic style is, in the Handbook’s 
estimation, worth attempting to articulate and preserve.20 The ALI itself, in other words, has an 
authorial voice that characterizes and identifies its work and distinguishes it from the published 
work of individual legal scholars.  
 The ALI’s self-developed and actively-enforced “voice” could be characterized as a 
formal element intended to enhance the authority of its work. As stated in the Handbook, the 
ALI’s objective “is to speak with an authority that transcends that of any individual, no matter 
how expert, and any segment of the profession, standing alone.”21 The ALI’s style, as “the 
manner in which its voice is presented, must transcend the styles and idiosyncracies of individual 
Reporters to make that asserted authority credible.”22  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
18American Law Institute.  Handbook at 3.  www.ali.org/doc/stylemanual.pdf.  Accessed 28 Feb 
2013. 
 
19Id. at 2-3. 
20Id. at 3. 




 The ALI’s concern that its authorial persona be manifested in a recognizable voice is 
consistent with Nils Jansen’s emphasis on the form in which Restatements are written as crucial 
to their authority, distinct from the persuasiveness of their content.23 Early on, the ALI’s 
founders disdained treatise- or textbook-like discursive treatments of the law that mixed 
statements of present law with history and legal theory. Instead, the Restatements were to consist 
of  “normative ‘statement[s] of the principles of the law’” drafted “‘with the care and precision 
of a well-drawn statute’, and with ‘the mental attitude ... of those who desire to express the law 
in statutory form.’”24 Single and decisive rules of law should be articulated even in the face of 
uncertainty about the present state of the law.25 And assuring that such articulations occur in a 
consistent voice is integral to their form.  
 To be sure, it is important not to overstate form’s significance. As discussed below, some 
jurisdictions never followed or adopted the law on some issues as articulated in the 
Restatements. Moreover, later generations of Restatements include components in addition to 
decisively-articulated rules in statutory-like form, in particular further commentary and the 
Reporter’s research notes. On the other hand, form matters greatly in legal discourse. As Marta 
Madero explains, “legal language partly functions like the neoclassical Latin of the humanists” 
because it was not intended as ‘breathless statement of fresh perceptions of the world.’”26 Legal 
                                                 
23See Jansen, Nils.  2010.  The Making of Legal Authority:  Non-legislative Codifications in 
Historical and Comparative Perspective 107-108. 
 
24Id. at 105, quoting American Law Institute, Report of the Committee Proposing the 
Establishment of an American Law Institute 20. 
 
25Id. 
26Madero, Marta.  2010.  Tabula Picta:  Painting and Writing in Medieval Law 3, quoting  
Baxandall, Michael, Giotto and the Orators.  1971.  Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the 
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language constitutes, like any language, “‘a collective attempt to simplify and arrange experience 
in manageable parcels.’”27 Perhaps form matters, not more that it does in legal discourse 
generally, but for distinctive reasons in the realm of Restatements. In particular, their core 
functions seem inexorably linked to the style in which they are written. 
 
                  Material 
 The essential material on which a Restatement draws is the decisional law of courts in the 
United States with the objective of stating underlying principles that give coherence to a subject. 
This is unsurprising in light of the concern of the ALI’s founders that “the underlying principles 
of the common law had become obscured by the ever-growing mass of decisions in the many 
different jurisdictions, state and federal, within the United States.”28 In Benjamin Cardozo’s 
assessment, the “fecundity of our case law”29 had become problematic; and, beneath sheer 
numbers of cases, many courts obscured the legal principles on which decisions turned, leading 
to considerable uncertainty in some jurisdictions. The ALI’s founders also understood that courts 
and judicial decisions are not “fungible.”30 In some jurisdictions, many issues remained 
unresolved by any case. And some courts were viewed as more authoritative than others. As 
                                                                                                                                                             
Discovery of Pictorial Composition.  1350-1450, 47. Many thanks to Emily Kadens for alerting me to 
Madero’s book. 
 
27Id. at 3, quoting Baxandall, supra note 26, at 44. 
28American Law Institute.  Handbook at 4-5.  www.ali.org/doc/stylemanual.pdf.  
Accessed 28 Feb 2013. 
 
29Cardozo, Benjamin N.  1924.  The Growth of the Law 4, quoted in  King, Joseph H. 2011.  The 
Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for Battery, and Reflections on the Province of 
Restatements.  Pepperdine Law Review 38:  623,651. 
 
30King, supra note 29, at 662. 
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Herbert Wechsler (the ALI’s third Director) wrote in 1969 of the first Restatement of Torts, 
“[e]ven as a law student forty years ago, I knew that germinal opinions like those of Judge 
Cardozo in the Palsgraf case ... had been embraced in the drafts of the first Restatement long 
before they had much following in other courts in the view that they were right and should be 
followed .....”31   
 Complicating the question of sources, contemporary Restatements may draw upon other 
materials, most importantly statutes. The ALI’s Handbook (2005) embraces statutes as legal 
sources much more broadly that did the ALI’s founding document (1923), in which “the existing 
law” was said to be found “in the decisions and scattered statutes.”32 A major interim 
development, acknowledged by the Handbook, is “the growing prevalence of statutes in the 
traditional fields of the common law” with some statutes “essentially codifications of the 
common law.”33 Separately, the ALI might determine that a statute that alters and supersedes a 
common-law rule is preferable and so state in a Restatement.34  
 According normative force to statutes represents a sharp departure from the ALI’s earlier 
days. The Agency Restatements are illustrative. Restatement (Third) of Agency relies on widely-
adopted statutes that supersede common-law rules. For example, it states that an individual 
principal’s loss of capacity does not automatically terminate an agent’s actual authority; the 
agent’s authority terminates only when the agent has notice that the principal’s loss of capacity is 
                                                 
31Wechsler, Herbert.  1969.  The Course of the Restatements. American Bar Association Journal 
55:147,149.  Quoted in King, supra note 29, at 663.  
 
32 American Law Institute.  Handbook at 7.  www.ali.org/doc/stylemanual.pdf.  Accessed 28 Feb 
2013.  (“and scattered statutes” is italicized in the Handbook, but not in the founding document). 
 
33Id. 
34Id. at 8. 
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permanent or that the principal has been adjudicated to lack capacity.35 This is contrary to the 
position taken in Restatement (Second) of Agency but is consistent with the widespread adoption 
of statutes that do not automatically void an agent’s actual authority upon the principal’s loss of 
capacity. These include a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provision protecting a bank (acting 
as agent) when a customer loses capacity, contemporary partnership legislation, as well as 
statutes in many states that permit the creation of durable powers of attorney.  
 In contrast, consider an episode at the 1927 Annual Meeting when discussion turned to a 
provision in the first Restatement of Agency that preserved the common-law rule that a woman’s 
marriage, by destroying her capacity to consent, also eliminated her ability to be bound by 
transactions entered into by an agent on her behalf, even an agent appointed before the marriage. 
Many states by that time had by statute abolished the common-law rule. An ALI member rose 
from the floor, characterized the common-law rule as “barbarous,” and urged the Reporter to 
omit it from the draft unless he could determine that some states still followed it. This 
recommendation was not adopted.36  Restatement (Second) of Agency, promulgated in 1957, 
demoted the issue to a Comment, which states that “[i]t is not within the scope of the 
Restatement of this Subject to state in detail the rules by which it is determined whether a person 
has capacity. The common grounds for incapacity are minority, marriage by a woman ....”37  
                                                 
35Restatement (Third) of Agency §3.08 (1). 
36DeMott, supra note 15, at 36. 
37Restatement (Second) of Agency §122.cmt.a.  A further comment seems to reflect the 
assumption that the common-law rule retained vitality as applied to married women, observing 
that “[w]here incapacity is created by marriage, by becoming an enemy alien, by losing 
citizenship or by conviction of a crime, the incapacity operates from the moment it is created 
until the condition ends.” Id. cmt. d. Likewise, a comment to an earlier sections states that “[t]o 
the extent that a married woman can contract or appoint others as agent, she has capacity to 
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 Contemporary Restatements may also refer to foreign law “for application by analogy,” 
in the Handbook’s formulation.38 Perhaps more strongly, the Handbook urges “[r]eporters to be 
alert to the possibility that a comparative-law perspective may enrich a particular explication and 
analysis of U.S. law.”39 On this score, both the second and third Agency Restatements included, 
among the advisers, members of law faculties in the United Kingdom.40 When reliable English-
language sources were available, Restatement Third of Agency discusses relevant rules from 
jurisdictions other than the United States, England and Wales, and Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
As it happens, in many business activities to which agency law is especially relevant— in 
particular those activities reliant on non-employee intermediaries such as brokers in shipping, 
reinsurance, and investment securities—the contemporary common law appears to share more 
similarities across common-law jurisdictions than in other private-law subjects. And the 
underlying business activity often takes place in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, the Third 
Restatement of Agency may make more use of comparative-law references than do other  
contemporary Restatements.     
    
                                                                                                                                                             
appoint her husband to contract or do other acts on her account, aside from statute.” Id. § 22, 
cmt. a. 
 




40For the Second Restatement, L.C.B. Gower served as an adviser through the third 
tentative draft. Professor Gower was at the time a visiting professor at Harvard Law School.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Agency viii. For the Third Restatement, Professors Francis M.B. 
Reynolds (Worcester College, Oxford) and Gareth Jones (Trinity College, Cambridge) served as 
advisers, Professor Jones throughout the project’s duration and Professor Reynolds from 1999 




             Functions 
 The ALI’s Handbook acknowledges that, from the beginning, “two impulses at the heart 
of the Restatement process” underlie a central tension: “the impulse to recapitulate the law as it 
presently exists and the impulse to reformulate it, thereby rendering it clearer and more coherent 
while subtly transforming it in the process.”41 It is also possible, as Joseph King recently wrote,  
that in retrospect the founders’ vision for the functions to be served by Restatements may appear 
more “crystallized or manifest” than the reality during the ALI’s early work.42 After all, the 
Restatement enterprise was novel, and how the founders’ initial intentions are now understood is 
difficult to detach from an assessment of the end-products. Moreover, these end-product 
Restatements differed, as did their Reporters, in their relative caution or boldness.43 For example, 
a member speaking at the ALI’s 1932 Annual Meeting noted the relative intellectual modesty of 
the Reporters44 for Agency in contrast with some of their colleagues. He urged the Reporter, 
Warren A. Seavey, and his advisers “to ‘lay down the rule which he thinks the courts should 
adopt rather than try to derive a rule from the decisions which is not fully developed.’”45 But 
Seavey replied that, when confronted by a rule that seemed unsound, “he had two options: ‘To 
                                                 
41ALI, Handbook at 4. 
42See King, supra note 29, at 659. 
43Kelley, Patrick J.  2007.  Introduction:  Did the First Restatement Adopt a Reform Agenda?.  
Southern Illinois Law Journal 32:3. 
 
44Floyd R. Mechem served as the initial Reporter from 1923 until his death in 1928. He 
was succeeded by Warren A. Seavey, who completed the first Restatement and served as the sole 
Reporter for the second Agency Restatement. See DeMott, supra note 15, at 18-23.  
 
45Id. at 31, quoting Warren A. Seavey, Discussion of the Restatement of Agency 




recite what the courts have decided or to say nothing.’”46  
 Cautious though it may have been, the first Restatement of Agency legitimated the 
subject by giving a coherent account of it. Agency’s intellectual merit—or its status as a 
distinctive subject—had previously been questioned by Roscoe Pound47 and challenged by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes with Holmes claiming that agency doctrine consisted of no more than a 
fiction identifying agent with principal, plus common sense.48 Seavey responded aggressively to 
Holmes in a 1920 law review article, arguing that scholarship could, through careful examination 
of judicial opinions, identify the operative elements and consequences of agency relationships, 
thereby “finding the rhyme and reason of the law which has grown on the fertile soil of a three 
party relationship.”49 One measure of the first Restatement’s success and influence and that of 
the successive two Restatements is that no competing account has emerged—no comprehensive 
treatise challenges the Restatement’s treatment of agency law in the United States. Indeed, the 
last comprehensive scholarly treatise on the law of agency in the United States was published in 
1914.50 Its author, Floyd R. Mechem, served until his death in 1928 as the Reporter for the first 
                                                 
46Id. 
47DeMott, supra note 15, at 28-30. 
48Holmes, Oliver Wendell.  1923.  The Common Law:180-183.  1891. Agency I.  Harvard Law 
Review 4: 345-350-351.  1891.  Agency II.  Harvard Law Review 5:1, 14. 
 
49Seavy, Warren A.  1920.  The Rationale of Agency.  Yale Law Journal 29:859. Seavey 
reported in his memoirs that this article was the basis on which he was invited to join the 
Restatement project as an adviser to the first Reporter, Floyd Mechem. As it happens, the 
Harvard Law Review (Holmes’s publisher) rejected Seavey’s article, according to Seavey. He 
joined Harvard’s faculty in 1929. DeMott, supra note 15, at 22 n. 74. 
 
50Mechem, Floyd R.  A Treatise on the Law of Agency:  Including not only a Discussion of the 
General Subject but also Special Chapters on Attorneys, Auctioneers, Brokers and Factors.  (1st ed. 




Restatement. The Agency Restatements thus became central to how lawyers and judges 
understood the subject and to the conceptual structure for teaching agency-law topics in law 
school curricula. In this respect, the Agency Restatements serve a function comparable to the 
celebrated English-law treatise, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, now in its nineteenth 
edition,51 because, like Bowstead and Reynolds, the Agency Restatements occupy uncontested 
intellectual terrain as comprehensive accounts of the subject. 
 In contrast, the first Restatement of Contracts (1932), with Samuel Williston as Reporter, 
differs in many ways from Arthur L. Corbin’s later (1950) magisterial treatise.52 Characterized 
as “something of a realist eminence grise,” Corbin wrote a comprehensive account of contract 
law that challenged the Restatement position’s on doctrinal points and, more broadly, reflected 
Corbin’s emphasis on the importance of facts in judicial decision-making.53 Readers who sought 
one had an alternative to the Restatement, and Corbin’s treatise was a work of wide scope and 
manifest scholarly depth. Similarly, in Torts, the first Restatement (1939) was followed by 
extensive writing by Leon Green54 and by William L. Prosser’s treatise.55 Green and Prosser 
provided accounts of tort doctrine that were far from identical, but both challenged the 
Restatement. Indeed, Prosser in turn served as the initial Reporter for the second Torts 
Restatement.  
                                                 
51 Bowstead and Reynolds.  2010.  Agency. P.G. Watts ed.20th ed. 
 
52Corbin, Arthur L.  1950.  Corbin on Contracts. 
53Duxbury, Neil.  1995.  Patterns of American Jurisprudence 140. 
54E.g., Green, Leon A.  1927. The Rationale of Proximate Cause.  1930. Judge and Jury. 
55Prosser, William L.  1952.  Handbook of the Law of Torts.  
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 The ALI’s Handbook, published in 2005, recognizes that Restatements may have a 
predictive (or leading-edge) function, in addition to clarifying and simplifying the law as it 
stands at the time of drafting. That is, “a significant contribution of the Restatements has also 
been anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending and expression of that development 
in a manner consistent with previously established principles.”56 As discussed above, as research 
resources the Agency Restatements serve a function comparable to well-regarded continuing 
treatises in the English tradition. But scholarly work in that tradition does not (or at least not 
necessarily) serve the leading-edge function embraced by the Handbook for Restatements.  
 As discussed above, the Reporters for the first Restatement of Agency did not aspire to 
anticipate or guide legal development. It may be that, for Restatements as a whole as an ongoing 
institutional project, endorsing and embracing this further goal became possible only after the 
relatively cautious precedents set by the first Restatements.57 They established the ALI’s 
institutional credibility. But perhaps each generation of Restatements is or was feasible or 
credible only in its own times. The first Restatements were the product of a simpler era’s law in 
the United States. A larger audience believed in the existence of a general common law, a belief 
reinforced by the ability of federal courts to develop general federal common law in cases 
involving disputes between parties of diverse citizenship. This landscape changed dramatically 
with the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, which required federal district 
courts, in cases involving state-law claims, to apply the same common law as would a state court 
                                                 
56American Law Institute.  Handbook at 5.  www.ali.org/doc/stylemanual.pdf.  Accessed 28 Feb 
2013. 
 
57Adams, Kristin David.  2007.  The American Law Institute:  Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of 




sitting in the same state.58 By the early 1960's, one leading federal appellate judge, Henry 
Friendly, characterized his function in interpreting state law as “akin to that of Charlie 
McCarthy, the famous ventriloquist’s dummy ....” and an intellectually unsatisfying task.59 
Relatedly, to aspire to guide legal development or anticipate it, as opposed to continuing in the 
cautious vein of the first generation of Restatements, makes a distinctive contribution.  
 After the first generation of Restatements the province of the common law itself, as a 
matter of positive law, became part of a legal landscape that included more statutes, more 
administrative regulation, as well as more legitimation of diffusion in common-law rules across 
jurisdictions. That’s not to say that empirically such diffusion occurred, but Erie blessed its 
legitimacy. Thus, it plausible that a more explicitly normative orientation for Restatements 
would follow in a more complex era, the common-law basics having already been addressed by 
the first generation of Restatements. To continue on exclusively in their vein would be, in 
Suzanne Lepsius’s assessment, to indulge in an exercise in an “artificial common law,” a 
construct unlikely to help a lawyer win a case and, after Erie, implausible as a portrait of “the 
                                                 
581938.  United States 304:64. 
59Dorsen, David M.  2012.  Henry Friendly:  Greatest Judge of His Era. 314.  Judge Friendly, a 
member of the ALI’s Council from 1961 until his death in 1986, was an influential participant in 
several ALI projects. Id. at 132. These involved the jurisdiction of federal and state courts, 
administrative law, corporate governance, conflicts of laws, codification of the federal securities 
laws, international jurisdiction, and a pre-arraignment code for prisoners. Id. Only one of these—
conflict of laws—was a Restatement project. Overall Friendly’s legal world was not the simpler 
common-law era reflected in the first generation of Restatements. His pre-judicial career 
involved complex business transactions and service as the general counsel of Pan American 
Airways. Although he wrote influential opinions applying common-law doctrines, his biographer 
emphasizes Friendly’s distinctive contributions to business law in judicial opinions and, in extra-




actual law in force ....”60     
  
    Reception and Application 
 In two jurisdictions, the Restatements are treated by statute as the de facto common law.  
In the Northern Mariana Islands, which became a United States Commonwealth in 1986, the 
1984 Code provides that “the rules of the common law as expressed in the Restatements of the 
law approved by the American Law Institute ... shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the 
Commonwealth in the absence of written or customary law to the contrary ....”61 Comparable 
language was added to the Code of the Virgin Islands in 1957.62 Kristin David Adams suggests 
that the history of the Virgin Islands, a Danish colony before they became a dependency of the 
United States in 1917, suggests an absence of “any immediate intention to permit the Islands to 
create their own laws.”63 The 1957 Code provision followed a 1921 Code provision comparable 
to prior colonial codes but focused on the common law of the United States, not Danish law.64 
Thus, writes Professor Adams, “[a]fter so many years of colonial rule, it may have felt more 
natural to the Islands at that time [1921] to look to the United States, an external source, for their 
laws.”65 
                                                 
60Lepsius, Suzanne.  Taking the Institutional Context Seriously:  A Comment on James 
Gordley.  232,242, in Nils Jansen and Ralf Michaels, supra note 5. 
 
61Northern Mariana Code.  7:§3401. 
62Virgin Island Code.  §4. 
63Adams, Kristin David.  2004.  The Folly of Uniformity:  Lessons from the Restatement 
Movement.  Hofstra Law Review 33:  423,429. 
 
64Id. at 428-429. 
65Id. at 429. 
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 Of course, in general Restatement provisions are not the object of wholesale 
incorporation by statute. Assessing their success often requires a retrospective look at their 
influence on courts and on scholarly discourse. For many years, the ALI itself published an 
annual table of cumulative case citations to each individual Restatement, broken down state-by-
state. Torts topped the last cumulative list by a large margin, followed by Contracts, then 
Agency.66 These citation counts, however, do not reveal whether the cited point was part of the 
case’s holding, or an obiter dictum, or even in a dissenting opinion from a divided court. Thus, 
proceeding with a finer-grained methodology may better assess relative success. A well-known 
example is judicial reception of the provision in Restatement Second, Torts on strict liability for 
harm caused by a defective product. Many state courts treated the provision—Section 402A—as 
tantamount to a statute, in one scholar’s assessment elevating the section and its comments to the 
status of “holy writ.”67 But this does not mean that courts uniformly adopted the principle stated 
in Section 402A; Delaware, North Carolina, and Massachusetts did not.68 Nor did the status of 
                                                 
66See American Law Institute.  2004 Annual Report Published Case Citations to Restatements of 
the Law.  www.ali.org/annualreports/2004/AM04_07-RestatementCitations04.pdf In particular, as of 
March 1, 2004, state and federal courts in the United States had cited the Restatements in 
published opinions 161,486 times. Of that total, Torts accounted for 67,336 citations, Contracts 
for 28,739, and Agency for 15,830. Conflict of Laws trailed Agency with 13,496 citations 
followed by Judgments with 10,773 and Trusts at 10,704. The table also breaks down citations to 
each Restatement on a state-by-state basis. These numbers are not adjusted for the overall 
number of published opinions from courts in particular states. Cumulatively across Restatements, 
California accounted for the largest number of citations (8264) followed by Pennsylvania (7874) 
and New York (6628). The 2004 data are the latest available, at least publicly. 
 
67Henderson, James A., Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski.  1995.  A Proposed Revision of Section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Cornell Law Review 77:1512.  Quoted in, inter alia, Vandall, 
Frank J.  1995.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(B):  Design Defect.  
Temple Law Review 68:167. 
 
68Christie, George C.  2012.  The Law of Torts.  5th edition.  In those states, product-defect 




Section 402A signal an end to evolution in the law. Over time, many courts confined the strict 
liability principle to instances of manufacturing defect, as opposed to claims of defective design 
or inadequate warning. The ALI followed suit; Section 402A was succeeded by a separate 
component of the third Torts Restatement focused solely on Products Liability that confines 
strict liability to manufacturing defects.69       
 
         Authority, Legitimacy, and Influence  
 The history of the Restatements sketched in this essay fits within the prototype of 
Searching for Utopia with which the paper began. Like the reins held by the rider astride the 
giant tortoise, the Restatements do not control their subsequent reception by courts. At times, as 
discussed above, Restatements may succeed in anticipating legal development; whether this 
constitutes guidance—as when the tortoise responds to a rein—or simply percipience—as when 
the rider casts his rein in the direction he predicts the tortoise will take—may depend on the 
observer’s methodology and perspective. The ALI, as the Restatements’ institutional author, 
constructed its voice and other elements of its authorial persona, such as the elaborate 
deliberative and iterative procedures that precede the final promulgation of a text as a 
Restatement, to enhance their usefulness, credibility, and persuasiveness. 
 The paper also demonstrates that some ambiguity accompanies the underlying 
terminology of authority and, for that matter, private law. To Nils Jansen, to say that a legal text 
is authoritative means that “the legal profession accept[s] it as an ultimate source of the law, 
                                                 




without requiring further legal reason to do so.”70 The relative authoritativeness of legal texts, 
when authorities conflict, is a function of “how they are applied and interpreted by professional 
lawyers and in the course of legal argument.”71 As a consequence, a text’s authority may not be  
stable over time and any asserted hierarchy among texts is always contestable.72 It is implicit, 
though, that legal “authority” stemming otherwise than from the state cannot be entirely self-
constructed by its promulgator, depending as it does on its reception by legal audiences. Thus, as 
the ALI summarizes the character of its authority in the Handbook, “[a]n unelected body like the 
American Law Institute has limited competence and no special authority to make major 
innovations in matters of public policy. Its authority derives rather from its competence in 
drafting precise and internally consistent articulations of the law.”73 One might add, however, 
that within the law of agency, “authority” itself is a term that connotes the right or power of 
legally-consequential representation of another person. Perhaps confusion with this meaning of 
“authority” underlies claims that Restatements stem from an unrepresentative institution, one not 
chosen through politically-accountable processes or even the legal profession as a whole. But 
this critique confines the meaning of “authority” to its agency sense, as opposed to credibility 
and reception by an intended audience. 
 To some legal practitioners and scholars in the United States, the term “private law” 
would not be common usage. Once again one’s prototype may be significant, and for some that 
                                                 
70Jansen, supra note 23, at 43. 
71Id. at 43-44. 
72Id. at 44. 
73ALI, Handbook at 5. 
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prototype is contract law. However, as discussed above, the Restatements were significant in 
articulating and furthering the development of tort law in the United States. Involving as it does 
the direct imposition by the law of duties, tort law is often controversial and can be the object of 
political disputes. Does it lie outside the province of private law, as Leon Green long argued?74 
Regardless of its characterization, tort law’s presence within the Restatements is important to 
understanding their history, accomplishments, and limitations.  
 Finally, and for many reasons, contemporary Restatements speak to an audience of 
disbelief in the existence of one common law that exists autonomously of invading influences, 
including statutes.75 Such a belief is inconsistent with the institutional circumstances of law and 
its development in the United States, which include the fact of federalism that underlies the Erie 
doctrine and procedural institutions such as lay juries. How to assess authority, influence, and 
success for a Restatement are more interesting questions once their contemporary audience 







                                                 
74E.g., Leon A. Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1959). 
75For further discussion, see DeMott, Deborah A.  2003.  Statutory Ingredients of Common 
Law Change:  Issues in the Development of Agency Doctrine.  Commercial Law and Practice 56, 68-73.  
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